Narrowly Tailoring the COVID-19 Response by Konnoth, Craig
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship 
2020 
Narrowly Tailoring the COVID-19 Response 
Craig Konnoth 
University of Colorado Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, Labor and Employment 
Law Commons, Legislation Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Supreme 
Court of the United States Commons 
Citation Information 
Craig Konnoth, Narrowly Tailoring the COVID-19 Response, 11 Calif. L. Rev. Online 193 (2020), 
https://www.californialawreview.org/narrowly-tailoring-covid-19-response/, available at 
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/1310/. 
Copyright Statement 
Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and 
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is 
required. 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact jane.thompson@colorado.edu. 
 
193 




I. Overview of the Coronavirus Response .............................................. 195 
II. Possible Concerns about Constitutionality ......................................... 197 
III. Government Relief ............................................................................ 200 
IV. Reconsidering Narrow Tailoring ...................................................... 202 
V. Nexus Between Burdens and Offsets ................................................. 205 
Conclusion .............................................................................................. 207 
INTRODUCTION 
The greatest impact of the novel coronavirus on most of our lives has not 
been physiological. Rather, the impact has come from state governments’ 
responses to the virus. In much of the country, stay-at-home measures have shut 
down our lives—including our ability to continue with our employment, study, 
religious practice, socializing, and access to arts and entertainment.1 
Commentary on the legality of these measures has been limited at the time of 
writing, but some commenters have suggested that courts might find them 
vulnerable on the grounds that they cannot survive heightened judicial scrutiny.2 
These commentators contend that although the measures serve an important state 
interest, they are not narrowly tailored to limiting COVID-19’s spread. While 
most individuals have been acquiescent so far, these commentators argue that 
“the lawsuits” may “start flying,” and indeed, some challenges have 
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  Copyright © 2020 Craig Konnoth 
 *  Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. My thanks to Jennifer 
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 1. See infra notes 18-27. 
 2. See infra notes 31-33. 
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commenced.3 As this essay goes to press, over 40 challenges appear to have 
commenced.4 
Given the situation that states have found themselves in, I believe that their 
response to the COVID-19 threat has been appropriate—and the limited judicial 
authority that exists at the time of writing agrees.5 But any court that applies 
heightened scrutiny and is inclined to hold otherwise should take into account 
offsets the government has provided when the court assesses the burdens that 
any plaintiff must endure. That is, while the government has imposed broad 
burdens across society, it has also offset those burdens through a series of 
measures including expanded unemployment compensation, one-time stimulus 
payments, and other kinds of assistance.6 As narrow tailoring requires the 
government to minimize the burdens placed on individuals, the narrow tailoring 
analysis should take into account both burdens as well as offsetting benefits that 
the government provides. 
This approach to narrow tailoring is novel. When the government burdens 
constitutional rights, such as rights to speech, assembly, or equal protection, 
there have been no programs that get the government off the hook by 
compensating individuals for the burdens imposed. While the mitigation efforts 
associated with the COVID-19 response were not adopted specifically to 
mitigate constitutional burdens imposed by that response, the effect of these 
efforts has nonetheless been to mitigate the burdens than many individuals have 
experienced. To be sure, the various shortcomings and ambiguities in the 
mitigation efforts adopted in relation to COVID-19 may mean that they will 
prove insufficient and irrelevant to any constitutional analysis. However, they  
offer a rare opportunity to think more broadly about how constitutional scrutiny 
should handle mitigation efforts. 
Part I offers an overview of the coronavirus pandemic and the government 
response. Part II offers a summary of the criticism that the response would fail 
to satisfy strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored. Part III summarizes 
 
 3. Harry Litman, Column: Here’s what’s wrong with Gov. Newsom’s stay-at-home order: It’s 
a legal mess, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 2526, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-03-25/gavin-
newsom-stay-at-home-order-quarantine-coronavirus-covid-19; Lindsey Wiley, The Coronavirus 
Lawsuits are Coming. That’s Not a Bad Thing, WASH. POST. (Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/23/coronavirus-lawsuits-are-coming-thats-not-
bad-thing/; Marshall Zelinger, Denver citing non-essential businesses for staying open during pandemic, 
9NEWS (Mar. 31, 2020),; https://www.9news.com/article/news/local/next/denver-citing-non-essential-
businesses-for-staying-open-during-pandemic/73-d8623d7b-16ff-4e41-a823-3c41818fe0a2. 
 4. John Kruzel, Legal challenges to stay-at-home orders gain momentum, THE HILL (May 16, 
2020) https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/498096-legal-challenges-to-stay-at-home-orders-
gain-momentum?fbclid=IwAR28fj_7vF0ssPDxAjdBjclbjtsfkirF3qGGXBhDVRFZlc4g1ugccb6kBEI. 
 5. See e.g. Binford v. Sunuu, Order on Pls’. Pet. for Prelim. Inj. & Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, No. 
217-2020-CV-00152, (N.H. March 25, 2020) 
https://www.courts.state.nh.us/caseinfo/pdf/civil/Sununu/032520Sununu-order.pdf; In re Abbott, Order 
Granting Writ of Mandamus, 954 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2020), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6827399-5th-Circuit-04072020.html. 
 6. See infra Part III. 
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the offsets the government has adopted to mitigate the burdens imposed by its 
coronavirus response. Part IV then excavates more fully the concept of narrow 
tailoring and argues that the government offsets should be taken into account. 
Part V limits the argument, explaining that only offsets that have a nexus to a 
certain set of constitutional burdens should be cognizable. 
I. 
OVERVIEW OF THE CORONAVIRUS RESPONSE 
Officially named Coronavirus Disease 2019, or COVID-19, the new or 
“novel” coronavirus was first identified in December 2019.7 The condition is 
highly infectious because of its low mortality rate and its tendency to spread 
while the patient is asymptomatic.8 Without intervention, the virus has a 
reproduction number (R0) of 2.2—that is, each infected person will spread the 
virus to more than two additional people.9 Depending on the jurisdiction, 
responses to curtail spread have varied. The problem is threefold. First, COVID-
19 is highly contagious, as already noted. Second, COVID-19 can survive on 
surfaces for days.10 This leads to the third problem: there is a shortage of 
COVID-19 tests, which will not disappear anytime soon.11 The President refuses 
to invoke statutory authority to produce more tests at the time of writing.12 As a 
result of the shortage of tests, it is hard to identify who is contagious and who is 
not. 
The solution has been to ask everyone to stay at home. This ensures that 
asymptomatic individuals cannot spread COVID-19 through contact, which is 
the standard purpose of quarantine.13 It also ensures that uninfected individuals 
will not catch the virus, themselves becoming vectors of transmission.14 
As is traditional, it is the states rather than the federal government that have 
imposed most coercive limitations.15 These limitations seek to prevent contact 
between individuals that could result in transmission. New York and California, 
 
 7. Anthony S. Fauci et al., COVID-19 — Navigating the Uncharted, 382 N. ENGL. J. MED 
1268 (2020). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. N van Doremalen, et al, Aerosol and Surface Stability of HCoV-19 (SARS-CoV-2) 
Compared to SARS-CoV-1, N. ENG. J. MED., Mar. 17, 2020, available at 
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMc2004973. 
 11. Donald Judd, America is Ramping Up Covid-19 Testing, but a Shortage of Basic Supplies 
is Limiting Capabilities, CNN.COM (Mar. 28, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/28/politics/coronavirus-swabs-supplies-shortage-states/index.html. 
 12. Joshua Gotbaum, Use the Defense Production Act for more than just Ventilators, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/28/use-defense-production-
act-more-than-just-ventilators/. 
 13. Tara Parker-Pope, What You Can Do About Coronavirus Right Now, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/world/coronavirus-preparation-preparedness.html. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Wendy E. Parmet & Michael S. Sinha, Covid-19 — The Law and Limits of Quarantine, N. 
ENG. J. MED (April 9, 2020) https://www.nejm.org/doi/10.1056/NEJMp2004211. 
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which have had among the highest cases, are among several states that have 
imposed “stay at home” orders and required all non-essential businesses to 
transition to operating online or closing.16 The businesses that states have shut 
down include restaurants, bars, coffee shops, spas, and barber shops.17 The 
federal government, in turn, has limited entry into the country.18 
The approach that the government has taken has affected the livelihoods of 
numerous individuals. Eighteen percent of respondents to a March 14 poll 
reported lost hours or employment.19 Food preparation and serving occupations, 
which employ over 8.3 million individuals nationwide,20 are projected to lose or 
limit 7.4 million jobs on one estimate.21 Nearly 50,000 retail stores have been 
shut down.22 Hotels have begun a first wave of laying off employees, nearly half 
a million of whom are under the age of 35.23 Airlines will suffer about $20 billion 
in losses and are laying off workers at a record pace.24 Other industries that have 
 
 16. Cal. Executive Order N-33-20 (Mar. 4 2020), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/3.19.20-attested-EO-N-33-20-COVID-19-HEALTH-ORDER.pdf; Governor 
Cuomo Issues Guidance on Essential Services Under The ‘New York State on PAUSE’ Executive Order, 
NY.GOV (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-issues-guidance-
essential-services-under-new-york-state-pause-executive-order; Bill Chappell & Vanessa Romo, New 
York, Illinois Governors Issue Stay At Home Orders, Following California’s Lead (Mar. 20, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/03/20/818952589/coronavirus-n-y-gov-
cuomo-says-100-of-workforce-must-stay-home. 
 17. Updated Notice of Public Health Order 20-22 Closing Bars, Restaurants, Theaters, 
Gymnasiums, Casinos, Nonessential Personal Services Facilities, and Horse Track and Off-Track 
Betting Facilities Statewide, Colorado Department of Public Health & Environment (Mar. 19, 2020), 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/14X5zbYPY7LJ8zzzSv_GcApJauFmsc5Ju/view. 
 18. Andrea Salcedo, Sanam Yar, & Gina Cherelus, Coronavirus Travel Restrictions, Across the 
Globe, N.Y. TIMES (April 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-travel-
restrictions.html. 
 19. NPR/PBS NewsHour/Marist Poll National Tables March 13th through March 14th, 2020, 
at 21, available at http://maristpoll.marist.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/NPR_PBS-
NewsHour_Marist-Poll_USA-NOS-and-Tables_2003151338.pdf#page=3. 
 20. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Household Data Annual Averages, 11b: Employed 
Persons by Detailed Occupation and Age, 2019 data, https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11b.pdf. 
 21. Challenger, Gray & Christmas Inc., Update: COVID-19 Has Claimed Over 3K Jobs, Over 
9M Threatened, CHALLENGERGRAY.COM, http://www.challengergray.com/press/press-
releases/update-covid-19-has-claimed-over-3k-jobs-over-9m-threatened (last accessed Mar. 29, 2020). 
 22. Jordyn Holman et al, 47,000 U.S. Stores Closed in About a Week Over Coronavirus, 
BLOOMBERG.COM (Mar. 24, 2020) https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-coronavirus-retail-
store-closings. 
 23. Lisette Voytko , Coronavirus Layoffs: Landry’s Inc., Philly YMCA Latest To Let Workers 
Go Amid Pandemic, FORBES.COM (Mar. 26, 2020) 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lisettevoytko/2020/03/22/coronavirus-layoffs-airports-latest-to-shed-
jobs-during-pandemic/#4c59f98c7b9d; BLS, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population 
Survey, Household Data Annual Averages, 18b: Employed Persons by Detailed Occupation and Age, 
2019 data, https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat18b.htm. (hotel housekeeping and hotel desk clerks). 
 24. Dawn Gilbertson, American Airlines Cuts 55,000 Flights, Parks 450 Planes Amid 
Coronavirus: ‘Fight of Our Lives’, USA TODAY (Mar. 18, 2020) 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/airline-news/2020/03/18/coronavirus-travel-fallout-united-
jetblue-allegiant-slash-flights/2863432001/; BLS, supra note 20. 
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been practically shut down include cruise lines,25 rideshare transportation,26 
movie theaters,27 and the film industry.28 
Individuals do not, of course, come together just to work. The states’ orders 
interfere with other important practices. For example, church pastors have been 
arrested for continuing in-person services with large groups of individuals.29 
In the long run, an ideal solution would be to create some kind of targeted 
system to make sure only those who are contagious or potentially contagious are 
kept quarantined or isolated. Indeed, top Obama healthcare advisor Zeke 
Emanuel has suggested the creation of a coronavirus “certification system” to 
ensure that only individuals who have been cleared can go out into the 
workforce.30 But existing technology and political will are far away from 
permitting such possibilities. After acknowledging that a coronavirus 
certification system “would require the full commitment and attention of the 
federal government,” Emanuel himself ends his article proposing such a system 
with a question: “Is that possible?”31 Unfortunately, the answer so far has been 
no. 
II. 
POSSIBLE CONCERNS ABOUT CONSTITUTIONALITY 
On formal constitutional accounts, judicial scrutiny of a challenged 
government regulation consists of two main components: an analysis of the 
purpose of the regulation and an analysis of the fit between the purpose and the 
kinds of restrictions the regulation imposes. Rational basis scrutiny only requires 
a legitimate purpose and a reasonable fit.32 Strict scrutiny, which applies in times 
of non-emergency when the government treads on fundamental rights, such as 
the right of assembly, requires a compelling interest to which the regulation is 
narrowly tailored.33 
 
 25. Amy Laskowski, Coronavirus Is Hitting the Cruise Line Industry Hard, BU.COM (Feb. 25, 
2020) http://www.bu.edu/articles/2020/coronavirus-is-hitting-the-cruise-line-industry-hard/ 
 26. Grant Suneson, Industries Hit Hardest by Coronavirus in the US Include Retail, 
Transportation, and Travel, USA TODAY (Mar. 21, 2020) 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2020/03/20/us-industries-being-devastated-by-the-
coronavirus-travel-hotels-food/111431804/. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Adam Epstein, Coronavirus is pushing an Already Vulnerable Film Industry Closer to the 
Edge, QUARTZ, (Mar. 9, 2020) https://qz.com/1813387/a-vulnerable-film-industry-feels-the-impact-
from-coronavirus/. 
 29. Tamara Lush & Chris O’Meara, Florida megachurch pastor arrested for holding services, 
defying social distancing orders, USATODAY.COM (Mar. 31, 2020) 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/03/31/coronavirus-florida-megachurch-pastor-
arrested-church-amid-orders/5093160002/. 
 30. Ezekiel Emanuel, We Can Safely Restart the Economy in June. Here’s How, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 28, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/opinion/coronavirus-economy.html. 
 31. Id. 
 32. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-41 (1985). 
 33. Id. at 439. 
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Legal commentary on the COVID-19 response has been sparse at the time 
of writing. However, because the government has taken action to limit important 
rights in light of the emergency, at least some authorities suggest that courts may 
decide to subject the coronavirus response to strict scrutiny. Former U.S. 
Attorney Harry Litman for example, argues in the Los Angeles Times that the 
government must “show that it has a ‘compelling interest’ . . . and that its action 
is the ‘least restrictive’ means for achieving it.”34 Public health law scholar 
Lindsey Wiley similarly suggests in the Washington Post that some judges may 
hold at least certain stay-at-home measures unconstitutional.35 Other legal 
scholars have argued that quarantine case law indicates that these measures call 
for heightened scrutiny.36 To be sure, there is authority that suggests that a 
heightened standard is not warranted. So far, courts reviewing state government 
actions have largely repudiated almost any judicial review,37 though Steve 
Vladeck and Lindsay Wiley have argued for a more robust judicial examination 
(without advocating for strict scrutiny).38 
Assuming, arguendo, that a court finds that fundamental rights are at stake 
and that some kind of heightened scrutiny therefore applies, a state would have 
to show both an important or compelling purpose—a requirement I assume is 
met here—and some kind of substantial tailoring between the purpose and the 
regulations at issue. But what exactly does this “narrow tailoring” mean? In his 
article Narrow Tailoring, Ian Ayres discusses various understandings of the 
concept.39 He suggests that on one reading, the burdens and benefits that the 
government distributes cannot be over- or under-inclusive.40 On another reading, 
the “government [must] achieve its compelling . . . interest in the way that least 
restricts or burdens the fundamental rights”—essentially, what amounts to a least 
restrictive alternative test.41 
 
 34. Litman, supra note 3. 
 35. Wiley, supra note 3. 
 36. Parmet, surpa note 15. 
 37. Lindsay F. Wiley & Steve Vladeck, COVID-19 Reinforces the Argument for ‘Regular’ 
Judicial Review—Not Suspension of Civil Liberties—In Times of Crisis, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (April 9, 
2020) https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/covid-19-reinforces-the-argument-for-regular-judicial-
review-not-suspension-of-civil-liberties-in-times-of-crisis/. See also Binford v. Sunuu, Order on Pls’. 
Pet. for Prelim. Inj. & Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, No. 217-2020-CV-00152, (N.H. March 25, 2020) 
https://www.courts.state.nh.us/caseinfo/pdf/civil/Sununu/032520Sununu-order.pdf; In re Abbott, Order 
Granting Writ of Mandamus, 954 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2020), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6827399-5th-Circuit-04072020.html. 
 38. Wiley & Vladeck, supra note 37. 
 39. Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1781, 1783 (1995). Ayres writes 
specifically in the context of affirmative action that seeks to remedy invidious discrimination. His 
account is not meant to be exhaustive, but it offers a framework through which to understand the concept. 
 40. Id. at 1787. 
 41. Id. at 1788. On yet a third account, which would apply in an equal protection context, narrow 
tailoring is designed to limit divisiveness between beneficiary and non-beneficiary groups. Situations 
where the government has to distinguish between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, especially in 
highly visible ways (such as by mandating racial quotas), can increase divisiveness. Id. at 1790-93. 
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The state would survive heightened scrutiny on the first understanding of 
narrow tailoring if we take it to mean that the state must avoid over- or under-
inclusiveness as much as possible. Assuming that this requirement would permit 
states to isolate only individuals who are contagious (though the case law in the 
area remains murky), it is likely that few tests would be available due to supply 
chain disruption to determine who is contagious.42 
The issue comes when we consider whether a regulation survives narrow 
tailoring under Ayres’s second account of the concept: has the government 
minimized burdens arising from the regulation, or adopted the least restrictive 
version of the regulation that is compatible with COVID-19 control? 
The extent to which the measures are necessary will change based on 
location and time. In much of the country, to be sure, it would appear that stay-
at-home orders are necessary: Lacking tests, states must enforce these orders to 
prevent deaths. Deaths in New York City and New Orleans, for example, have 
grown exponentially, as have the number of cases.43 Some outliers might emerge 
due to the success of government efforts: at the time of writing, the San Francisco 
Bay Area has managed to “flatten the curve,” limiting the rate of increase of 
infections.44 There are variations across other areas as well.45 Further, if 
measures do not work, the virus spreads to new locations, requiring government 
in those locations to adopt measures.46 Thus, whether a government action 
satisfies heightened scrutiny for a skeptical court will be a constantly evolving 
analysis depending upon where and when the litigation is occurring. 
Nonetheless, even if a court applies heightened scrutiny, it may yet 
appropriately conclude that the exigent circumstances and lack of tests mean that 
the state has minimized burdens no matter the location. Indeed, I am on record 
suggesting that compliance is appropriate.47 Moreover, the states’ orders permit 
individuals to engage in essential activities, such as grocery shopping, and even 
outdoor exercise—they seem reasonably narrowly tailored.48 And again, while 
tests would allow the states to ease restrictions, there is evidence that even if 
 
 42. Robert P. Baird, Why Widespread Coronavirus Testing Isn’t Coming Anytime Soon, NEW 
YORKER (Mar. 24, 2020) https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-widespread-coronavirus-
testing-isnt-coming-anytime-soon 
 43. Bernadette Hogan, New York’s Coronavirus Death Toll Jumps 100 in Just One Day to 385, 
N.Y. POST (Mar. 26, 2020); Katy Reckdahl et al, New Orleans Faces a Virus Crisis, and Mardi Gras 
May be Why, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2020). 
 44. Maura Caslyn et al, Social Distancing To Fight Coronavirus: A Strategy That Is Working 
and Must Continue, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Mar. 25, 2020) 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/news/2020/03/25/482278/social-distancing-fight-
coronavirus-strategy-working-must-continue/. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Derrick Bryson Taylor, A Timeline of the Coronavirus Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 
2020) https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-timeline.html. 
 47. Chelsea Brentzel, Over 1,600 complaints related to COVID-19 health order filed in El Paso 
County, KRDO (April 7, 2020) https://krdo.com/news/2020/04/07/over-1600-complaints-related-to-
covid-19-health-order-filed-in-el-paso-county/ 
 48. See Colorado order, supra note 17. 
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action had been taken sooner, availability would have been limited due to supply 
chain disruption.49 
However, should courts conclude that the measures are too broad, it would 
appear that state governments would be faced with two alternatives: either do 
nothing and risk numerous deaths or issue broad stay-at-home orders that 
arguably impinge on individual rights. 
III. 
GOVERNMENT RELIEF 
The burdens that the COVID-19 response has imposed are extensive, but 
the federal government has taken measures to minimize the burden. In its first 
bill, passed March 6, the federal government sought only to increase emergency 
preparedness for the virus and boost screening and testing capacity.50 On March 
18, the government passed a bill that would also alleviate the harms the response 
to the virus has imposed. The Families First Coronavirus Response Act51 
increases unemployment benefits, offering states nearly $1 billion for paying 
unemployment insurance and processing fees, and increases assistance in certain 
states for individuals who have already exhausted benefits.52 A similar amount 
is allocated to maintain food security, including funding for the Special 
Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children and for those 
households where the child’s school has been closed for at least five consecutive 
days.53 Finally, employers with fewer than 500 employees must provide 
employees with two weeks of paid sick leave if they are subject to quarantine, 
are experiencing symptoms of COVID–19, or have children in schools that have 
closed.54 
The Response Act is dwarfed by an even larger stimulus statute, the 
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) passed on 
March 27, with a price tag of $2 trillion. The statute provides one-time $1200 
payments to individuals earning less than $75,000 a year per their 2018 or 2019 
tax returns, phasing these payments out as individuals approach $99,000 a year.55 
Those eligible for payments receive $500 per child.56 Payments were intended 
 
 49. Baird, supra note 42. 
 50. Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. 
116-123 (Mar. 6. 2020). 
 51. H.R. 6201, Pub. L. 116-127 (2020) available at 
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr6201/BILLS-116hr6201enr.pdf. 
 52. Id. at 15-18. 
 53. Id. at 2-3, 7 to 12. 
 54. Id. at 12-15, 18-24. 
 55. H.R. 748 at 55 (enrolled bill), https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr748/BILLS-
116hr748enr.pdf (hereinafter CARES Act). 
 56. Id. 
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to arrive within three weeks, per the Treasury Secretary.57 The CARES Act also 
expands unemployment benefits for at least 13 weeks over what states usually 
offer and renders self-employed individuals and part-time workers eligible.58 
The statute provides for a three-month eviction moratorium for tenants in 
properties on which there are mortgages backed or owned by federal entities such 
as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, barring landlords from charging fees or penalties 
for nonpayment of rent.59 It provides for $350 billion to the Small Business 
Administration to provide loans of up to $10 million per business, many of which 
are forgivable.60 Finally, the statute allocates $15.5 billion for the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), with an additional $450 million for food 
banks and other community food programs.61 
States are imposing similar relief measures. For example, executive orders 
by Colorado’s governor instituted a moratorium on evictions and utility 
disconnection and sought to expedite unemployment claims payments in the face 
of record filings.62 The city of Denver created a $4 million relief fund for small 
businesses and artists.63 Other states and localities have taken similar steps, 
which have included measures from the creation of community childcare centers 
to the implementation of microloan programs.64 
For some, the benefits may be significant. Indeed, one scholar calculates 
that based purely on the federal unemployment benefits expansion, some 
workers earning up to $60,000 per year who lose their jobs will earn more money 
through the unemployment benefits expansion than they would have earned 
when holding their jobs, as long as they receive the expanded benefits.65 To be 
sure, this calculation does not take into account lost benefits, but many 
employers, for example restaurants, do not offer their employees benefits.66 This 
calculation also does not take into account the $1200 stimulus payment. 
 
 57. Tara Bernard, F.A.Q. on Stimulus Checks, Unemployment and the Coronavirus Plan, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 28, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-stimulus-package-questions-
answers.html. 
 58. CARES Act, supra note 55, at 35 (limiting assistance to 39 weeks). See Bernard, supra note 
57 (states cap unemployment assistance at 26 weeks or less). 
 59. CARES Act, supra note 55, at 211. 
 60. Id. at 10, 17-21, 41. 
 61. Id. at 228. 
 62. Col. Exec. Order No. D 2020 012 (Mar. 20, 2020) available at 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mMCRLb6PxMPI680_THFn4nqLGAty1jq9/view. 
 63. Conrad Swanson, Denver Mayor Announces Economic Relief for Businesses Hurt by 
Coronavirus, DENVER POST (Mar. 19, 2020) https://www.denverpost.com/2020/03/19/denver-
coronavirus-small-business-relief/. 
 64. Credit Karma Staff, Coronavirus Federal, State and Local Relief Measures, CREDIT 
KARMA (Mar. 28, 2020) https://www.creditkarma.com/advice/i/coronavirus-us-state-local-relief-
measures/. 
 65. Email from Nadav Orien Peer to Craig Konnoth. 
 66. Rosie Bradbury, 31% of restaurants offer health insurance to workers, suvery finds, 
RESTAURANT DIVE (July 31, 2019) https://www.restaurantdive.com/news/survey-31-of-restaurants-
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IV. 
RECONSIDERING NARROW TAILORING 
In light of this government relief, let us return to the least restrictive 
alternative approach to narrow tailoring. This approach is ubiquitous in 
heightened scrutiny analysis across constitutional doctrines.67 Across each of 
these areas of doctrine, the court looks to see whether the government, at the 
outset, could have adopted a more limited regulation—one that minimized 
burdens on important interests—and still achieved its purpose.68 
In the affirmative action context, for example, the Supreme Court has 
looked to see whether the government could have achieved its objective through 
“race-neutral” means, thus (in theory at least) not imposing the indignity of 
discrimination when it could have been avoided.69 In the dormant Commerce 
Clause cases, similarly, the Court has looked to see whether states could have 
achieved their purpose without discriminating against out-of-state commerce. 70 
Similarly, in the free speech context, the Court has disapproved state regulation 
that limited speech by pharmaceutical entities steering consumers towards higher 
priced drugs.71 Instead of imposing that restriction, the Court noted, a state could 
counter pharmaceutical speech “through its own speech.”72 More recently, in 
Hobby Lobby v. Burwell, the Court (in applying a statutory least restrictive 
alternative test) invalidated an Affordable Care Act that employer insurance 
offer contraceptive benefits.73 The reason: the government could have 
established (and, in other circumstances, had established a program through 
which it, rather than the employer, would offer the coverage).74 
 
 67. See generally Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An 
Analysis, A Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REV. 971 (1974) (discussing equal protection, 
First amendment, due process, and Commerce Clause case law). See also C. Scott. Hemphill, Less 
Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 950 n.89 (2016) (listing cases from 
numerous areas of constitutional law). 
 68. I envisage the challenges as due process rather than equal protection challenges since the 
restrictions are broad and apply to nearly every individual equally, notwithstanding their individual 
circumstances. 
 69. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297, 312 (2013) (narrow tailoring “require[s] a court to 
examine with care, and not defer to, a university’s ‘serious, good faith consideration of workable race-
neutral alternatives.’”). But see Ayres, supra note 39, at 1790 (arguing that race-neutral means counter 
this version of narrow tailoring). 
 70. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (asking “whether alternative means” where 
the state did not discriminate “could promote . . . [its] purpose as well”). 
 71. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2674 (2011) (asking whether state interest could 
“‘be served as well by a more limited restriction’” (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980))); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 
U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be 
at least as effective” (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997)). 
 72. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671. 
 73. Hobby Lobby v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2800–02 (2014). While the requirement for less 
restrictive means was statutorily imposed, the Court’s application was consistent with the constitutional 
cases on which it relied. Indeed, the statutory test was drawn from the Court’s since-overruled 
constitutional doctrine. Id. at 2760. 
 74. Id. 
2020] NARROWLY TAILORING THE COVID-19 RESPONSE 203 
However, while these cases consider the burden the government imposed 
at the outset, they did not consider any offsetting compensation that the 
government may have offered to mitigate the burden. The reason for that is 
simple: the government rarely, if ever, provides an offset for a constitutional 
violation. 
Commenters have considered the possibility of constitutional offsets, most 
prominently in the debate over whether constitutional rights should be protected 
by liability rules rather than property rules.75 A property rule would render 
unconstitutional any action by the government that deprives an individual of 
rights. Under a liability rule, it would be constitutionally valid for the 
government to take actions that would otherwise violate protected rights as long 
as it pays for the privilege of doing so. Eugene Kontorovich, for example, argues 
that during national security emergencies, “upon finding a detention program 
unconstitutional, courts could refuse to enjoin it and instead award the detainees 
money damages for the duration of their confinement. This is essentially a 
Takings Clause approach to nonproperty rights.”76 This, he argues, is the 
superior outcome, because in emergencies, especially those where transaction 
costs are high, courts will be reluctant to altogether enjoin detention programs 
carried out in the name of national security. Without a liability rule alternative, 
courts will likely simply hold these programs constitutional. Under a liability 
rule, those burdened will at least be paid for their pains..77 Other authors have 
made similar arguments.78 
Although my primary task here is not to critique Kantorovich’s approach, 
I do not think that it is the best way for constitutional law to take cognizance of 
government offsets. Indeed, I believe that critics of Kantorovich are correct in 
arguing that his conclusion is undermined by constitutional text, by the intent of 
the Framers, and for various other reasons.79 Moreover, it represents a sharp 
departure from existing constitutional doctrine. 
 
 75. Other scholars have briefly considered the issue. For example, Reva Siegel has noted that 
legislatures that impose abortion restrictions could adopt “measures to offset the consequences of 
compelled motherhood for women, whether by compensating them, or by protecting their employment 
and education opportunities, or by affording them needed medical services and child care.” Siegel, 
Reasoning From the Body: An Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal 
Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 366 (1992). The failure to do so suggests that women are viewed 
stereotypically. 
 76. Eugene Kantorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass 
Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 755, 759 (2004). 
 77. Notably, he invokes the possibility of applying this approach during quarantines as well. Id. 
at 825-26. 
 78. Michael Morley, Public Law at the Cathedral: Enjoining the Government, 35 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2453, 2471 n. 102 (collecting numerous other articles). 
 79. Id. 2475-79 (offering numerous rebuttals to Kantorovich’s argument). Indeed, I believe that 
expressive harms from adopting liability rules are even higher, as individuals are less likely to see rights 
protected by liability rules as inalienable. Cf. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the 
Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1545 (1998) (noting that endowment effects are 
higher with property rules). 
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A far more natural doctrinal context in which to consider constitutional 
offsets that is far more consistent with existing case law, is the context of narrow 
tailoring, when courts consider whether the government has minimized the 
burdens it has imposed. In the consideration of whether burdens have been 
minimized, there seems to be no reason for not considering both the regulation 
imposing the burden, and complementary steps the government has taken to 
alleviate it. If the assessment that the Court employs—as it always has—is the 
total burden a regulation imposes on an individual, then the regulation itself, as 
well as corollary regulations should be taken into account. 
Analyzing narrow tailoring in this manner offers a new lens upon the 
restrictions the government has imposed. If courts choose to impose heightened 
scrutiny and then find that the government’s actions are not justified even by the 
exigent circumstances that exist, courts should look to offsets. Offset legislation, 
like the Response and CARES Acts, may render the regulation more narrowly 
tailored. 
The narrow tailoring approach I offer would not represent a massive 
doctrinal innovation. Courts have not, to my knowledge, considered offsets in 
determining whether narrow tailoring has occurred, but they have not had the 
opportunity: governments appear never to have provided such offsets or argued 
that those offsets provide for narrow tailoring. But when courts consider how 
much individuals are burdened, it would make little sense for them to exclude 
benefits and compensation that accompany the burden. Existing constitutional 
doctrine, then, is compatible with considering the burden imposed in toto. 
At the same time, such offset legislation may offer greater leeway to 
legislatures. Courts often defer to legislatures in cases of scientific uncertainty.80 
But where legislatures fear that courts may not defer, for whatever reason—for 
example, where research is uncertain or contradictory—legislatures may offer 
offsets that minimize burdens to further insulate their regulation from judicial 
invalidation. 
I emphasize, however, that while it offers us an opportunity to think about 
how to incorporate offset analysis into constitutional scrutiny, my claim here is 
not that offset legislation would  necessarily insulate stay-at-home orders from 
constitutional challenge. First, the Response and CARES Acts have proven to be 
a limited response to the challenges individuals face. Housing protections have 
been uncertain and unclear.81 Small business assistance has run out within days 
of its enactment.82 Further, as this Essay goes to press, states are facing deep 
shortfalls, in part from the shutdown policies they pursued, and will be cutting 
 
 80. Stephanie Tai, Uncertainty About Uncertainty: The Impact of Judicial Decisions on 
Assessing Scientific Uncertainty, 11 J. of Const. L. 671, 673 (2009). 
 81. Email from Jana Happel, Colorado Legal Services, to Craig Konnoth, on file with author. 
 82. Erica Werner et al, Treasury’s Mnuchin seeks additional $250 billion to replenish small-
business coronavirus progam, WASH. POST (April 7, 2020) https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-
policy/2020/04/07/treasury-coronavirus-small-business/. 
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spending to important programs such as Medicaid.83 This may affect the analysis 
of the net burden individuals experience.   
More importantly, the Acts were not passed in order to minimize burdens 
on fundamental rights: they minimize the burdens of economic harms, which 
may or may not align with a fundamental rights analysis. It is, after all, unclear 
that the right to come together to engage in economic production and earn a 
livelihood is fundamental.84 It is clear that the right to assemble for religious 
worship is fundamental.85 The CARES Act, however, is designed to offset 
burdens for those who have suffered economic harm. Thus, all individuals do 
not obtain benefits from the Act to the same degree. Those who remain employed 
and enjoy a high income, for example, may obtain no aid. If those individuals 
challenge state actions, the government can show no offset. But the vast majority 
of Americans will be able to claim some offset as a result of the CARES Act, 
and the courts should take into account those offsets when deciding whether the 
states’ actions pass constitutional muster.86 
V. 
NEXUS BETWEEN BURDENS AND OFFSETS 
How exactly do we assess whether a burden and offsetting benefits are 
sufficiently related such that they should be assessed together? In other words, 
imagine an individual who owns a renewable energy business challenges the 
stay-at-home regulation, which costs her significant revenue.87 Unrelated to 
those public health orders, the legislature passes significant subsidies for 
renewable energy, the same day the stay at home order is issued, that would end 
up effectively revitalizing the individual’s business.88 Assume that the subsidy 
legislation had been in the works for months, long before COVID-19 was a 
known entity. It would seem strange for a court to conclude that it should take 
 
 83. Elise Schmelzer & Sam Tabachink, Gov. Jared Polis limits evictions, cuts immediate state 
spending by $228.7 million, DENVER POST (May 1, 2020) 
https://www.denverpost.com/2020/05/01/polis-coronavirus-covid-state-spending/. 
 84. To my mind, it should be, within appropriate limits. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Further 
Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1104 (1986). 
 85. Cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 188 
(2012) (noting the heightened protections of religious organizations). 
 86. To take economic stimulus payments as an example, 70% of American households in 2018 
earned $99,000 or less in 2018 and are eligible for offsetting stimulus payments under CARES. 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/203183/percentage-distribution-of-household-income-in-the-us/. 
Assuming that at least some of the additional 22% of households that earn less than $199,000 are two-
income households, they too would be eligible for offsets. Moreover, individuals can take advantage of 
employment compensation benefits no matter what their income. 
 87. See Michael Holder, Coronavirus: Falling Power Demand is Impacting Clean Energy, 
GREEN BIZ (Mar. 26, 2020) https://www.greenbiz.com/article/coronavirus-falling-power-demand-
impacting-clean-energy (discussing how the virus’s spread is affecting renewable energy). 
 88. See Craig Konnoth, Preemption through Privatization, 134 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2021) (discussing such subsidies). 
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the unrelated subsidy legislation into account when assessing the burden of the 
public health order. 
In other words, there should be some relationship between the government 
legislation that burdens and the legislation that offsets the burden. We might look 
to other areas of the law that similarly demand a nexus between pieces of 
legislation. Most prominently, Spending Clause doctrine requires that Congress 
may induce states to engage in certain behavior as a condition of federal funding 
only if, inter alia, the condition is stated unambiguously and is “directly related” 
to some specific, national program.89 Thus, in National Federation of 
Independent Businesses v. Sebelius (NFIB), the Court held that Congress could 
not “terminate . . . independent grants” if the state did not accept its conditions.90 
At issue in NFIB was a condition Congress imposed in the Affordable Care Act: 
either states expanded Medicaid to cover numerous additional categories of 
individuals, or they lost all Medicaid funding.91 A bare majority of the Court held 
that the changes “accomplishe[d] a shift in kind, not merely degree” and were a 
whole new program.92 The dissent disagreed, noting that Medicaid had been 
expanded dramatically before.93 Either way, as NFIB is the first time that the 
Court struck down Spending Clause legislation in this way, the doctrine is not 
sufficiently developed to be instructive for other areas of law. 
The test I propose is a causal nexus between the offsets and the burdens that 
are imposed. That is, the offsets would not have been provided but for the 
regulatory burdens. It would not matter whether the legislation is in the same or 
different bill: sometimes provisions in omnibus bills are completely unrelated.94 
And as with the COVID-19 response, related regulatory responses may pass 
weeks apart from each other. 
Indeed, offsets may be adopted not just at different times but by different 
authorities. The shelter-in-place orders are the product of municipal and state 
regulation. While the federal offsets sometimes give discretion to local entities 
to determine whether or not to mitigate, many of the key steps are federally 
driven. However, it would be wrong to conclude that since the states did not 
engage in mitigation, their public health measures are therefore not narrowly 
tailored.95 The federal government’s response is understandable only in light of 
the measures that states have adopted. Indeed, as scholars of federalism 
emphasize, states and the federal government often act as partners, including by 
 
 89. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987). 
 90. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 583. 
 93. Id. at 641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 94. Abbe Gluck et al, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 
1789, 1800 (2015). 
 95. Indeed, given the states’ lack of ability to obtain supplies for COVID-19 testing and 
mitigation, it would appear that they have no means at their disposal to mitigate the burden beyond 
lobbying the federal government. 
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co-administering programs such as the health insurance exchanges in the 
Affordable Care Act (some run by state governments and some by federal 
entities),96 co-enforcing federal health privacy laws,97 and coordinating on law 
enforcement.98 
States are similarly enmeshed within Centers for Disease Control 
programs: the CDC has established state networks for key initiatives such as 
injury prevention, on which states take the lead.99 The CDC has funded state 
responses to COVID-19,100 and, starting in January, began hosting calls with 
“state and local partners” to monitor the COVID-19 situation.101 State public 
health orders should be seen as a product of such federal-state partnerships rather 
than as solely determined by individual states. Similarly, states often play a role 
in shaping federal legislation; indeed, on certain understandings of federalism, 
states are represented through their congressional delegation, especially by their 
Senators, in shaping legislation.102 And the federal legislative response would 
make no sense outside of the context of state-led efforts. Thus, the federal 
legislation should be seen as a response to the state legislation, that is, as an effort 
to mitigate the measures states adopted in consultation with the CDC. Narrow 
tailoring analysis should proceed with an eye to these efforts to mitigate. 
CONCLUSION 
The response to COVID-19 is not yet over. The approach I have offered 
gives governments flexibility should their public health orders be found 
constitutionally wanting. Additional offsets are already on the table: politicians 
at both the state and federal level are calling for further remedial measures.103 
 
 96. See generally King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015) (describing federal and state 
exchanges); Konnoth, supra note 88. 
 97. Konnoth, supra note 88. 
 98. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Law Enforcement Coordination, https://www.justice.gov/usao-
ndca/law-enforcement-coordination (last accessed Mar. 29, 2020). 
 99. Ctrs. For Disease Control & Prevention, Injury Prevention & Control, Regional Networks, 
https://www.cdc.gov/injury/stateprograms/regionalnetworks/index.html (last accessed Mar. 29, 2020). 
 100. Ctrs. For Disease Control & Prevention, CDC to Award Over $560 Million to State & Local 
Jurisdictions in Support of COVID-19 Response (Mar. 11, 2020) 
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Such measures present insufficiencies and ambiguities that may render them 
constitutionally irrelevant in the COVID-19 crisis—but they do offer new ways 
to think about narrowly tailoring constitutional scrutiny. 
